Solving the Illegal Robocalling Problem
Illegal robocalling continues to plague consumers, more than interrupting with nuisance calls about automotive extended warranties, they have become the point of entry for scammers who prey on consumers.
“Unwanted calls – including illegal and spoofed robocalls – are the FCC’s top consumer complaint and our top consumer protection priority” – Former FCC Chairman Ajit Pai
Falsification of a caller’s identity, or caller ID spoofing, is a favorite deception used by illegal robocallers and scammers to get their victims to answer the call. Whether the call appears to be from a neighbor, a bank, a utility or a government agency, consumers often fall for the deception, costing millions of dollars per year in fraud.
Regulators worldwide are strengthening efforts to combat fraud and unwanted calls through caller ID authentication frameworks. In the United States, the FCC and FTC enforce the TRACED Act, which mandates STIR/SHAKEN to verify caller identity, while countries such as France and Brazil have introduced similar authentication requirements.
The Objectives of STIR/SHAKEN
While complicated in implementation, the simple objective of STIR/SHAKEN is to secure the identity of the calling party, allowing the called party to know with relative certainty who initiated the call. For the subscriber, this should re-establish trust in the caller ID displayed on their telephone, presenting an icon or text that indicates that the caller-ID information is valid.
A second objective of implementing STIR/SHAKEN is to improve the analytics used to detect and block illegal robocallers, allowing legal robocallers (reverse 9-1-1, doctor’s appointment reminders, etc.) to reliably reach their intended recipients.
A third objective is to provide tools for law enforcement, enabling them to identify the source of phone calls, maintain a record of potentially illegal activity, and provide a strong deterrent.
STIR/SHAKEN Theory of Operation
The design of STIR/SHAKEN is centered around creating an encrypted identity token at the originating service provider, passing it through the network to the terminating service provider, who verifies its authenticity. Using well-understood public key infrastructure (PKI), STIR/SHAKEN relies on certificates managed by a Certificate Authority (CA) that closely manages issuance and revocation, limiting issuance to vetted and credentialed telephony service providers.

Figure 1: STIR/SHAKEN Architecture
As shown in Figure 1, a simplified STIR/SHAKEN architecture encompasses a number of key elements:
Calling Party – the initiator of the call, a known customer of the originating telephone service provider (TSP).
Called Party – the intended recipient of the call, likely a subscriber on a different TSP.
Originating TSP – the service provider that first handles the call from the calling to the called party, is responsible for attesting to the authenticity of the caller, using an Authentication Service to create a secure telephone identity token. The identity is embedded in the SIP signaling before passing the call to the Terminating TSP.
Authentication Service – using the call information and attestation, creates an encoded identity token, returning the token to the Originating TSP.
Terminating TSP – the service provider that services the called party, validates the identity token using a caller ID Verification Service, and relays the results of the verification to the Called Party.
Verification Service – decodes the identity token, verifies the token with the certificate public key, and relays the verification status (true/false) back to the Terminating TSP.
Certificate Repository – a shared service that hosts the certificates for each of the trusted service providers.